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 Abstract 
Based on previous research on cultural differences in analytic and holistic reasoning, I 
hypothesized that when explaining events, North Americans would be more likely than 
East Asians to expect causes to resemble events with respect to magnitude (i.e., big 
events stem from big causes and small events stem from small causes). In addition, I 
hypothesized that these differences would be explained by cultural differences in the 
tendency to reason analytically or holistically. In a series of studies, Canadian and 
Chinese participants judged the likelihood that high or low magnitude events were caused 
by high or low magnitude causes. Events included a disease outbreak, a delay in a 
business negotiation, and damage caused by a tornado moving through a city. In two 
studies, participants from both cultural groups expected events and their causes to 
correspond in magnitude. More importantly, as hypothesized, Canadians expected events 
and their causes to correspond in magnitude to a greater degree than did Chinese. In a 
third study, I ruled out a potential alternative explanation that Chinese may have simply 
been exhibiting a response bias. In a fourth study, in support of my hypothesis that these 
cultural differences were due to differences in the reasoning styles of Canadians and 
Chinese, I found that Canadians primed to reason holistically expected less cause-effect 
magnitude correspondence than did those primed to reason analytically. These findings 
have important theoretical implications for the research literature on attributions and on 
cultural and social cognition, as well as practical implications in the context of judgment 
and decision making. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Millions of years ago, giant lizard-like creatures called dinosaurs dominated the 
earth until one day when an enormous meteor crashed to the planet’s surface. The impact 
of the meteor caused permanent global changes in weather patterns that soon rendered 
this entire collection of colossal creatures extinct. Most of you have heard this 
explanation for the disappearance of the dinosaurs, and although you probably had little 
training in the natural sciences at the time, the explanation seemed plausible. One reason 
this explanation appealed to your senses was that the magnitude of the cause, a giant 
meteor that changed global weather patterns, and the magnitude of the effect, the 
extinction of a populous set of gargantuan reptiles, correspond with one another. Had you 
been told that a small mouse-sized meteor tumbled to the surface and wiped out this 
abundant assortment of gigantic creatures, you probably would have considered this 
explanation less plausible. Although the meteor explanation for the disappearance of the 
dinosaurs is not without controversy, other plausible explanations tend to conform to the 
same pattern; that is, they are large in magnitude.  
But do causes and effects always correspond in magnitude? In the 1960s, 
American mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz created a computer 
simulation of hydrodynamic flow (Lorenz, 1963). Allegedly, while using the computer 
simulation to model weather patterns, Lorenz entered the value .506 rather than the actual 
value .506127. He noticed that the outcomes stemming from the two ostensibly similar 
initial values varied substantially. Upon publishing his findings, one meteorologist 
remarked that if the theory was correct, one flap of a seagull's wings could change global 
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 weather patterns forever. Over time, through some form of cultural metamorphosis, the 
ungainly seagull transformed into a delicate butterfly, and the term ‘butterfly effect’ was 
born. Many variants of the butterfly effect have since emerged predicting, for example, 
that the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Beijing can alter the path of a tornado in Oklahoma. 
Regardless of whether or not this amusing anecdote is true, Lorenz found that seemingly 
negligible variations in initial conditions led to dramatic divergences in outcome patterns. 
Furthermore, Lorenz’s 1963 article had a major impact on the atmospheric sciences and 
eventually played a part in the development of Chaos Theory. 
Lorenz’s finding has been surprising to many of us because it violated our 
expectations of cause-effect magnitude correspondence. Why do we expect big causes to 
lead to big effects and small causes to lead to small effects? Is it simply because we 
seldom observe violations of this association and thus have developed a heuristic that 
serves us well most of the time? The present research indicates that the explanation is far 
more interesting and complex. 
The Representativeness Heuristic  
As an example, let us take a moment to think about Tom, a high school senior 
who is intelligent and has a high need for order and clarity but lacks creativity. He tends 
to write in a dull and mechanical fashion and feels little sympathy for other people. Given 
a list of academic disciplines such as engineering, computer science, law, humanities, 
education, and social work, what discipline would you predict Tom to have entered in 
university? Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that when forming such predictions, 
people relied mostly on the degree of similarity between Tom and a prototypical member 
of each academic discipline. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that this strong 
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 tendency to rely on the degree of similarity caused errors in judgment because 
participants ignored the percentages of students enrolled in each discipline, or the base 
rates. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) referred to this type of judgment as the 
representativeness heuristic.  
Most of the research conducted on the representativeness heuristic has focused on 
errors in judgments people make when categorizing targets into groups on the basis of 
similarity (Gilovitch & Savitsky, 2002), such as the study described in the previous 
paragraph. However, the representativeness heuristic is not limited to categorization. 
People also use this heuristic when making causal judgments, such as when searching for 
causes that are similar to an effect. Gilovitch and Savitsky reasoned that relatively little 
research has been conducted on the representativeness heuristic in the domain of causal 
judgments because unlike Kahneman and Tversky’s paradigm, establishing that an error 
in judgment has been made is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, across a variety of 
domains including medicine, pseudoscientific systems, and psychoanalysis, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that people appear to employ the representativeness heuristic when 
making causal judgments by relying on similarities between causes and effects (Gilovitch 
& Savitsky, 2002).  
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) divided such similarities into two categories, 
physical resemblance and congruity of strength. Throughout history, we see numerous 
examples of causal reasoning that most likely stemmed from a search for causes that 
physically resembled effects. For example, the Azande believed that the burnt skull of the 
red bush-monkey could treat epilepsy (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Red bush-monkeys move 
in a chaotic and frenzied manner. The Azande most likely adopted the treatment after 
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 observing that the movements of red bush-monkeys resembled those of people 
experiencing epileptic seizures. Einhorn and Hogarth’s second category, the tendency to 
search for causes that resemble effects in congruity of strength is often reinforced by 
daily experience. In the physical world, numerous examples exist where causes and 
effects resemble one another in strength. For example, a large stone falling to the ground 
would create a larger impact than a small stone. However, we also see examples where 
the heuristic fails us. Contrary to our intuition, Galileo demonstrated that large stones do 
not fall faster than small stones, but rather they fall at the same rate.  
Similar to Einhorn and Hogarth, Nisbett and Ross (1980) proposed that people 
may seek causes that correspond in magnitude with events they are trying to explain. For 
example, an editorial in an early twentieth century Washington newspaper mocked the 
suggestion by Walter Reed that yellow fever, with all of its devastating effects, was 
caused by the tiny mosquito. Likewise, many people would agree that it seems 
"outrageous that a single, pathetic, weak figure like Lee Harvey Oswald should alter 
world history" (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 252).  
Apart from conjecture by Einhorn and Hogarth, Nisbett and Ross, and a few 
interesting and supporting anecdotes, however, there is little research evidence that 
people do indeed expect causes and effects to correspond in magnitude. Only a relatively 
small number of empirical studies have provided supporting evidence consistent with 
such speculation. 
Empirical Research on Expectations of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence  
 
 In one of the first studies that indirectly provided supporting evidence that people 
expect cause-effect magnitude correspondence, Shultz and Ravinsky (1977) 
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 demonstrated that French-Canadian schoolchildren from kindergarten to the sixth grade 
typically chose causes that were similar to effects. For example, in one scenario, they 
attributed a loud noise to a heavy rather than a delicate lever. This particular scenario is 
consistent with the proposal that people choose causes that correspond in magnitude with 
effects. However, the other scenarios used would fall under Einhorn and Hogarth’s 
physical resemblance category. For example, after watching a short video clip of a child 
engaging in either physical or verbal retaliation against a bully, children attributed 
physical retaliation to physical rather than verbal aggression.  
McCauley and Jacques (1979) also provided indirect supporting evidence of an 
expectation of cause-effect magnitude correspondence. In their study, American 
participants read one of two headlines, “A man shoots at the president and misses” or “A 
man shoots at the president and kills him.” Participants then estimated the probability that 
the man was acting alone and the probability that he was acting as a member of a group. 
The authors found that participants tended to attribute the more consequential effect, the 
successful assassination, to the group and the less consequential effect, the unsuccessful 
assassination, to the individual. However, this study does not provide strong evidence 
supporting an expectation of cause-effect magnitude correspondence because participants 
could be attributing the more consequential effect to a conjunction of causes, a group, 
more than a single cause, a lone gunman. In addition, the two outcomes differ in an 
important way other than magnitude. Missing, versus hitting, the president suggests 
incompetence on the part of the shooter, and thus the magnitude of the outcome is 
confounded with the content of the outcome. Describing a scenario whereby a shooter 
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 hits the president who then either becomes incapacitated versus recovers, would provide 
a more systematic manipulation of magnitude. 
McClure, Lalljee, and Jaspars (1991) examined if people explained extreme and 
moderate effects by using a conjunction of causes or a single cause. For example, British 
students visiting Oxford University on an open day read that, “Roger Peterson murdered 
seven people, mutilated their bodies, and buried them in a field near his home” (extreme 
crime), and that, “John Reid hit a number of people with a bottle at a football match” 
(moderate crime). Participants explained the effects, and each response was coded as a 
single cause or a conjunction of causes. Participants subsequently chose between a single 
explanation and a conjunction provided to them by the researchers. McClure et al. found 
that the majority of participants preferred single-cause explanations to conjunctions of 
causes. More importantly, for some scenarios describing extreme outcomes, participants 
generated single extreme causal explanations. However, this pattern of results did not 
emerge across all outcomes, and the authors were unable to identify a moderating factor 
that might account for such inconsistencies. 
A recent set of studies by Ebel-Lam, Fabrigar, MacDonald, and Jones (2008) 
provided more direct support for an expectation of cause-effect magnitude 
correspondence. Canadian university students read a scenario describing either a high or 
moderate magnitude effect. For example, participants read that either a plane crashed 
killing everybody onboard (high magnitude) or that with difficulty the pilot successfully 
landed the plane (moderate magnitude). Participants estimated the likelihood that a 
number of high and moderate magnitude causes had led to the effect. Participants 
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 attributed high magnitude effects to high magnitude causes and low magnitude effects to 
low magnitude causes. 
Either directly or indirectly, the aforementioned studies provided consistent 
evidence that people (at least, Americans, British, and Canadians) typically expect a 
correspondence in magnitude between an effect and its cause. Why is this so and is it true 
across cultures? Research from the cultural psychology literature should provide some 
clues. 
Cultural Differences in Analytic and Holistic Reasoning  
Contrary to the Washington newspaper article mocking Walter Reed’s suggestion 
that yellow fever was caused by a tiny mosquito, Asian folk wisdom states, “One tiny 
insect may be enough to destroy a nation.” Research indicates that compared with North 
Americans (including Americans and Canadians), East Asians (including Chinese, 
Japanese, and Koreans) differ in their reasoning about cause-and-effect relationships 
(Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003; Maddux & Yuki, 2006; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001). That is, East Asians tend to reason holistically; whereas North 
Americans tend to reason analytically (Nisbett et al., 2001).  
Based on the work of Nisbett and colleagues (2001), holistic and analytic thought 
can be contrasted on a few essential cognitive tendencies. First, holistic thinkers attend to 
the entire field, whereas analytic thinkers attend to focal or central objects. As a result, 
holistic thinkers attend to relationships among objects within the field and attribute 
causality to the field, whereas analytic thinkers attend primarily to central of focal objects 
in the field, categorize these objects, and assign causality to them.  
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 It is important to note that holism does not appear to be a simple uniform 
construct determined by a single cognitive mechanism. For example, researchers have 
focused on at least four factors under the umbrella term holism: causality (Choi et al., 
2003), attitude toward contradiction (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999), perception of change 
(Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001), and locus of attention (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; see also 
Nisbett et al., 2001). The present research focused on the causality factor. Let us examine 
the relevant research more closely. 
 Across a variety of domains, East Asians attend to situational factors or contexts 
more than North Americans do, and North Americans attend to focal people or objects 
more than East Asians do (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). For example, one set of 
studies found that when describing an underwater scene, the first element Americans 
typically mentioned was a focal element, such as a large fish in the center of the picture. 
In contrast, the first element Japanese typically mentioned was a contextual element, such 
as seaweed (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). In addition, Japanese focused on the entire scene 
as a unit, and their ability to recall a focal object from the scene was impaired when the 
background was altered. Alternatively, Americans focused on the focal objects 
independent of the background, and changing the background had little or no effect on 
their ability to recall a focal object.  
 Focusing relatively different amounts of attention on focal objects and contexts 
has implications for other aspects of cognition, such as the ability to detect covariation 
among stimuli. People who focus on focal objects more than contexts should be less 
likely to detect covariation between elements in a scene compared with people who 
attend to both focal objects and contexts. Ji, Peng, and Nisbett (2000) asked participants 
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 to estimate the degree of covariation between images on a computer screen, and this is 
exactly what they found. That is, compared with American estimates, Chinese estimates 
were better calibrated with actual levels of covariation. 
If Easterners attend more to contextual elements and notice a greater degree of 
covariation between elements than do North Americans, then they should explain effects 
differently. This pattern has been found when people make attributions. When people 
observe a person’s behavior in a social situation, a number of elements are present other 
than the person. That is, other people are often involved and the person is acting in a 
surrounding context or situation. If an observer focuses relatively more attention on the 
situation, then the observer should be more likely to attribute causality to that situation. 
Alternatively, if an observer focuses relatively more attention on the focal person, then 
the observer should attribute causality to that person. Consistent with this reasoning, past 
research has shown that Asians tend to make more situational attributions; whereas 
Americans tend to make more dispositional attributions (e.g., Miller, 1984 with Indian 
participants; Morris & Peng, 1994 with Chinese participants). 
Choi et al. (2003) further explicated the cultural differences in reasoning by 
demonstrating that Easterners typically have more complex causal theories and, therefore, 
consider more causal factors in their attributions than do Westerners, who typically have 
relatively simple causal theories. For example, in Choi et al., American and Korean 
participants read that, “A graduate student killed his or her advisor.” Participants then 
judged the causal relevance of each of 97 pieces of information. Sample items included, 
“The graduate student’s history of mental disorders” and “Whether the professor ever 
sexually harassed the graduate student.” Participants were instructed to choose only items 
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 that were relevant to establishing a motive for the graduate student to have murdered his 
or her advisor. Koreans considered a greater number of items to be relevant in 
establishing a motive than did Americans. Additionally, Choi et al. developed and 
included a 10-item measure of holistic tendency. The measure included statements such 
as, “Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes are 
not known.” Higher levels of agreement with these statements indicated a relatively more 
holistic thinking style. Koreans were more holistic than were Americans, and within each 
culture, individual differences in holism were related to the number of relevant items 
included. That is, the higher a participant’s holistic tendency, the greater the number of 
items considered relevant to establishing a motive. 
Present Research 
To summarize the cross-cultural literature, East Asians reason holistically; 
whereas North Americans reason analytically. Notably, holism does not appear to be a 
simple uniform construct determined by a single cognitive mechanism. For example, 
researchers have focused on at least four factors under the umbrella term holism: 
causality, attitude toward contradiction, perception of change, and locus of attention 
(Choi et al., 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001). The present research focused on the causality 
factor. With respect to causality, East Asians reason holistically by focusing on many 
causes; whereas North Americans reason analytically by focusing on relatively fewer 
causes (Choi, et al., 2003).  
If an observer tends to focus on one or a few causes only when explaining an 
effect, then the observer will expect a greater correspondence in magnitude between 
cause and effect. For example, imagine being shown pictures of two buildings and asked 
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 how likely one sold for a higher price. The two buildings look very similar except that 
one is larger than the other. If all else were equal, one would expect the larger building to 
sell for more because size is one factor that determines the value of a building. However, 
a number of other factors also determine the value of a building, such as location and 
interior condition to name a few. If an observer tends to focus on only one cause, such as 
the magnitude of the size of the building in this case, when trying to understand a high 
magnitude effect, such as a higher selling price, then that person should expect a high 
magnitude cause, such as the larger building to be far more likely than a low magnitude 
cause, such as the smaller building (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EEC EEc 
 
Figure 1:  Single-cause model of an effect (the size of each letter and circle 
represents the magnitude of the cause (C) and the effect (E)). 
 
Alternatively, if an observer tends to focus on many factors when explaining an 
effect, then the observer will expect a lesser correspondence in magnitude between cause 
and effect. Considering the previous example, if an observer tends to focus on numerous 
 11
 factors, including size, location of the building, and other factors, when trying to 
understand a high magnitude effect, such as a higher selling price, then a high magnitude 
cause, the larger building, is not as necessary. Although both people may reason that the 
larger building would still likely sell for more than the smaller building, the larger 
building would seem more likely to have sold for a low price to someone with a multiple-
cause focus than someone with a single-cause focus. The lesser correspondence between 
the magnitudes of cause and effect make sense because one of the other factors, such as 
location, could be working against the larger building and in favor of the smaller building 
when it comes to selling price (see Figure 2). 
 
 
EEc 
CE
CE 
CECE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Multiple-cause model of an effect (the size of each letter and circle 
represents the magnitude of the cause (C) and the effect (E) and the direction of each 
arrow represents the directionality of the cause).  
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Therefore, based on previous research on cultural differences in analytic and 
holistic reasoning, specifically regarding differences in perceptions of causal complexity, 
I hypothesized that expectations of a correspondence in magnitude between effects and 
their causes would be stronger among North Americans than among East Asians.  
Specifically, I hypothesized that when explaining an effect, North Americans would tend 
to look for causes that correspond in magnitude with the effect. High or low magnitude 
effects should instigate a search for correspondingly high or low magnitude causes. In 
contrast, East Asians would be less likely than North Americans to expect such a 
correspondence in magnitude between effects and their causes. Lastly, I predicted that the 
cultural differences in the tendency to look for causes that correspond in magnitude with 
effects would be explained by differences in analytic and holistic reasoning. I conducted 
a series of studies to test these hypotheses.  
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 Chapter 2 
Study 1 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to test the hypothesis that Canadians would expect a 
greater correspondence in magnitude between effects and their causes than would 
Chinese. Participants read hypothetical scenarios with consequences of high or low 
magnitude and indicated how likely the effect was due to causes that were high or low in 
magnitude.  I used two different versions of scenarios with two different samples, one in 
Study 1a and the other in Study 1b. 
Study 1a 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine European-Canadians (45 women and 14 men) were recruited from 
Queen’s University, and 60 Chinese (30 women and 30 men) were recruited from Beijing 
University. In all of the studies in this paper, Canadian participants were Caucasians of 
European descent and Chinese were Chinese nationals, mostly of Han descent. Canadian 
participants received course credit or $5 for their participation, and Chinese participants 
received a small gift.  
Materials and Procedure (see Appendix A for all experimental materials) 
Participants read a questionnaire describing a disease outbreak that either killed 
some people (high magnitude effect) or hospitalized them (low magnitude effect). The 
effect was followed by two potential causes, a highly infectious strain of bacteria (high 
magnitude cause) or a standard strain of bacteria (low magnitude cause). Participants 
rated the likelihood that each of the two causes had led to the effect on a 9-point scale (1 
 14
 = not likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). In summary, Study 1a had a 2 (culture: 
Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (effect magnitude: high vs. low) by 2 (cause magnitude: 
high vs. low) design. The cause magnitude factor varied within-participants, and the other 
factors varied between-participants.  
The study materials were generated by two Canadian and two Chinese researchers 
to ensure they were familiar and realistic to both cultures. Pilot testing indicated that 
Chinese and Canadians perceived the magnitudes and independent likelihoods of effects 
and causes to be equivalent. All materials were first developed in English and then 
translated into Chinese. The Chinese and English versions were then compared by two 
Chinese researchers who had lived in North America for at least four years. Additionally, 
a back-translation procedure was used to check consistency of meaning, and finally the 
translations were checked by at least three Chinese researchers in China to ensure they 
were free of error and that they sounded natural. The same procedure for generating and 
translating study materials was followed in all the studies reported in this paper.  
Results and Discussion 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
 Preliminary analyses indicated no significant gender effects, Fs > 1, as was true 
for all studies reported in this paper. Thus gender will not be discussed further.  
A 2 (culture) X 2 (effect magnitude) X 2 (cause magnitude) mixed-design 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of effect magnitude, 
F(1, 115) = 13.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, such that participants in the high magnitude effect 
condition gave higher likelihood ratings for the causes (M = 5.89, SD = .91) in 
comparison with those in the low magnitude effect condition (M = 5.27, SD = .92). This 
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 pattern indicated a stronger reaction to the high magnitude effect compared with the low 
magnitude effect. The effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction also was 
significant, F(1, 115) = 160.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .58. Overall, participants tended to 
associate the high magnitude effect with the high magnitude cause (M = 7.73, SD = 1.40) 
more than with the low magnitude cause (M = 4.05, SD = 1.77), t(115) = 11.07, p < .001, 
and the low magnitude effect with the low magnitude cause (M = 6.82, SD = 1.67) more 
than with the high magnitude cause (M = 3.72, SD = 2.21), t(115) = 9.40, p < .001.   
More importantly, the culture by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction 
was significant, F(1, 115) = 13.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Follow-up mixed-model t tests on 
the interaction indicated that to account for the high magnitude event, Canadians rated the 
high magnitude cause as more likely than did Chinese and rated the low magnitude cause 
as less likely than did Chinese, ts(115) > 1.65, ps < .05. For the low magnitude event, 
Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as less likely than did Chinese and rated the 
low magnitude cause as more likely than did Chinese, ts(115) > 2.20, ps < .02. Therefore, 
as hypothesized, Canadians tended to exhibit a stronger cause-effect magnitude 
correspondence than Chinese (see Figure 3). 
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 Figure 3. Canadian and Chinese likelihood estimates (+ SE) of high and low 
magnitude causes leading to high and low magnitude effects 
Note.  SE = Standard Error. 
 
 
Study 1b 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-four European-Canadians (57 women and 27 men) were recruited from 
Queen’s University, and 60 Chinese (33 women and 27 men) were recruited from Beijing 
University. Canadian participants received course credit or $5 for their participation, and 
Chinese participants received a small gift.  
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 Materials and Procedure (See Appendix B for all experimental materials) 
Study 1b followed a similar design and procedure to Study 1a but had a different 
scenario. The scenario described either a long negotiation delay (high magnitude effect) 
or a brief negotiation delay (low magnitude effect). The causes were a major 
disagreement (high magnitude cause) or a minor one (low magnitude cause). In summary, 
Study 1b had a 2 (culture: Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (effect magnitude: high vs. low) 
by 2 (cause magnitude: high vs. low) design with the cause magnitude varying within-
participants, and the other factors varying between-participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
 The results were similar to those obtained in Study 1a. A 2 (culture) X 2 (effect 
magnitude) X 2 (cause magnitude) mixed-design ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of effect magnitude, F(1, 140) = 4.12, p = .04, ηp2 = .06, such that the likelihood 
ratings for causes were higher in the high magnitude effect condition (M = 5.53, SD = 
.81) than in the low magnitude effect condition (M = 5.25, SD = .82). The effect 
magnitude by cause magnitude interaction was significant, F(1, 140) = 133.36, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .49. Overall, participants tended to associate high magnitude effects with high 
magnitude causes (M = 7.10, SD = 1.63) more than low magnitude causes (M = 3.96, SD 
= 1.87), t(140) = 10.48, p < .001, and low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes 
(M = 6.75, SD = 1.81) more than high magnitude causes (M = 3.74, SD = 1.77), t(140) = 
10.18, p < .001.  
 More importantly, the culture by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction 
was significant, F(1, 140) = 20.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Follow-up mixed-model t tests on 
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 the interaction indicated that to account for the high magnitude event, Canadians rated the 
high magnitude cause as more likely than did Chinese and rated the low magnitude cause 
as less likely than did Chinese, ts(140) > 2.44, ps < .01. For the low magnitude event, 
Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as less likely than did Chinese and rated the 
low magnitude cause as more likely than did Chinese, ts(140) > 3.08, ps < .005. 
Therefore, Canadians tended to exhibit a stronger cause-effect magnitude correspondence 
than Chinese (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Canadian and Chinese likelihood estimates (+ SE) of high and low 
magnitude causes leading to high and low magnitude effects 
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 Thus, for both the disease (Study 1a) and the negotiation (Study 1b) scenarios, 
Canadians associated high magnitude effects with high magnitude causes more than low 
magnitude causes and low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes more than high 
magnitude causes. And in both scenarios, Chinese exhibited this pattern to a significantly 
lesser degree. 
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 Chapter 3 
Study 2 
One potential limitation of Study 1a is that the scenario is related to medicine, a 
domain in which East Asians tend to be especially holistic (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007). 
For Study 1b, cultural differences in negotiation styles might lead Chinese to expect, 
relative to Canadians, that small disagreements could likely lead to long negotiation 
delays. Lastly, for both studies, the results could be a product of the methods that were 
used, for example if the two cultural groups attend to the information in the scenarios 
differently. 
Although I could find no research evidence that would strongly and specifically 
support any of these alternative explanations, I felt it would be important to demonstrate 
the generalizability my findings across different scenarios and methods. Thus, the 
purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the results from Study 1 using different scenarios and 
a different format. Study 1 manipulated the magnitudes of causes and effects in detailed 
scenarios. In Study 2, I used simple scenarios that were described using pictures of 
common effects. Again, participants read hypothetical scenarios with consequences of 
high or low magnitude and indicated how likely the effect was due to causes that were 
high or low in magnitude.   
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-eight European-Canadians (46 women and 32 men) were recruited from 
Queen’s University, and 60 Chinese (27 women and 33 men) were recruited from Beijing 
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 University. Canadian participants received course credit or $5 for their participation, and 
Chinese participants received a small gift.  
Materials and Procedure (See Appendix C for all experimental materials) 
Participants were randomly assigned to a high or low effect magnitude condition. 
In each condition, they were presented first with a picture of two basketball players, one 
tall (high magnitude cause) and one short (low magnitude cause), and they indicated the 
likelihood that each of the two players had scored the most points (high magnitude effect) 
or the least points (low magnitude effect) in a game. Next, participants were presented 
with a picture of two tornadoes that had traveled through a city, one wide (high 
magnitude cause) and one narrow (low magnitude cause), and they indicated the 
likelihood that each tornado had caused extensive damage (high magnitude effect) or no 
damage (low magnitude effect). The likelihood judgments were made on a 9-point scale 
(1 = not likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). In summary, Study 2 had a 2 (culture: 
Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (effect magnitude: high vs. low) by 2 (cause magnitude: 
high vs. low) design. The cause magnitude factor varied within-participants, and the other 
factors varied between-participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Likelihood Estimate Computation 
 Each participant completed both scenarios (basketball game and tornadoes). For 
each scenario, participants gave two likelihood estimates, one for a high-magnitude cause 
and one for a low magnitude cause. The pattern of the results was the same for each of 
the two scenarios. Therefore, I combined the scenarios by averaging the two likelihood 
estimates for the high magnitude causes and by averaging the two likelihood estimates 
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 for the low magnitude causes. These two averages were then treated as repeated-
measures variables. 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
 A 2 (culture) X 2 (effect magnitude) X 2 (cause magnitude) mixed-design 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of effect magnitude, F(1, 134) = 23.72, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .15, such that participants in the high magnitude effect condition gave higher 
likelihood ratings for the causes (M = 5.72, SD = .67) in comparison with those in the low 
magnitude effect condition (M = 5.22, SD = .45). The effect magnitude by cause 
magnitude interaction was significant, F(1, 134) = 50.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. Overall, 
participants tended to associate high magnitude effects with high magnitude causes (M = 
6.80, SD = 1.28) more than with low magnitude causes (M = 4.63, SD = 1.30), t(134)  = 
8.32, p < .001, and low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes (M = 5.91, SD = 
1.71) more than high magnitude causes (M = 4.54, SD = 1.73) , t(134) = 5.21, p = .001.  
Similar to Study 1, the culture by effect magnitude by cause magnitude 
interaction was significant, F(1, 134) = 7.48, p = .007, ηp2 = .05. Follow-up mixed-model 
t tests on the interaction indicated that to account for the high magnitude event, 
Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as more likely than did Chinese and rated the 
low magnitude cause as marginally less likely than did Chinese, ts(134) > 1.65, ps < .07. 
For the low magnitude event, Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as less likely 
than did Chinese and rated the low magnitude cause as marginally more likely than did 
Chinese, ts(134) > 1.73, ps < .09. Therefore, Canadians exhibited a stronger cause-effect 
magnitude correspondence than Chinese (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Canadian and Chinese likelihood estimates (+ SE) of high and low 
magnitude causes leading to high and low magnitude effects 
 
 
Thus, in two detailed scenarios represented by words in Study 1 and two simple 
scenarios represented by pictures in Study 2, Canadians associated high magnitude 
effects with high magnitude causes more than low magnitude causes and low magnitude 
effects with low magnitude causes more than high magnitude causes. Furthermore, for all 
four scenarios, Chinese exhibited this pattern to at least a marginally lesser degree (in 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 2).          
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 Chapter 4 
Study 3 
In Studies 1 and 2, I found that compared with Chinese, Canadians expect effects 
and their causes to correspond in magnitude to a greater degree. I argue that the pattern of 
results is caused by cultural differences in holistic reasoning. However, a simple 
alternative explanation exists: The results from Studies 1 and 2 could be explained by a 
stronger preference to choose midpoints on scales by Chinese than by Canadians.  In both 
studies, participants rated their likelihood judgments on a Likert-type scale. Chen, Lee, 
and Stevenson (1995) found evidence that East Asians typically prefer points closer to 
the midpoints of such scales even though the degree of midpoint-response bias in their 
study was weak, especially comparing Chinese and Canadians. Furthermore, other 
studies have found no such tendency (e.g., Ji, Schwarz, & Nisbett, 2000).  
Nonetheless, I designed Study 3 to rule out the possibility that Chinese were 
engaging in such a moderacy-response bias. Instead of rating the likelihoods of causes on 
a scale, participants chose the cause they perceived to have most likely led to the effect. If 
the same pattern of results as in Studies 1 and 2 emerged regarding participants’ choices, 
then these results would provide strong evidence against the alternative explanation.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three European-Canadians (48 women and 15 men) and 63 Chinese 
nationals living in Canada (44 women and 19 men) were recruited from Queen’s 
University. Participants received course credit or $5 for their participation. At the time of 
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 the study, the Chinese nationals had lived in Canada for an average of 28.83 months (SD 
= 13.54). 
Materials and Procedure (See Appendix D for all experimental materials) 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the high or the low effect 
magnitude condition. Within each condition, participants read three scenarios. A scenario 
was used from Study 1a (disease outbreak described in words) and both scenarios were 
used from Study 2 (basketball game and tornadoes depicted in pictures). In the high 
magnitude effect condition, all three scenarios described high magnitude effects, and 
likewise in the low magnitude effect condition, all three scenarios described low 
magnitude effects. For each scenario, participants chose the more likely cause of the 
effect between the high and the low magnitude causes. Additionally, participants 
indicated their confidence in each choice on an 8-point scale (1 = not at all confident, 8 = 
extremely confident). In summary, Study 3 had a 2 (culture: Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 
(effect magnitude: high vs. low) by 2 (cause magnitude: high vs. low) design. The cause 
magnitude factor varied within-participants, and the other factors varied between-
participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
 Each participant chose three causes, one for each scenario. Each choice was 
analyzed separately by conducting a 2 (culture) by 2 (effect magnitude) by 2 (cause 
magnitude) log-linear analysis. For all three scenarios, the analyses revealed significant 
interactions between effect magnitude and cause magnitude, all G2s > 25.72, all df = 1, all 
ps < .001, indicating that for each scenario, participants were more likely to associate 
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 high magnitude effects with high magnitude causes than with low magnitude causes, and 
low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes than with high magnitude causes, χ2s > 
8.41, ps < .004. More importantly, for all three scenarios, the analyses revealed 
significant culture by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interactions, all G2s > 13.58, 
all df = 1, all ps < .001. For all three scenarios, Canadians were more likely to exhibit the 
magnitude matching pattern than were Chinese, χ2s > 6.34, ps < .01 (see Table 1 for 
frequency counts). Thus, I successfully replicated the results from Studies 1 and 2 using a 
method that did not rely on a Likert-type scale, suggesting that a midpoint preference by 
Chinese was unlikely to account for the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1. Frequencies of Canadian and Chinese cause magnitude choices (and 
percentages within each culture) 
 
  Disease Outbreak Basketball Game Tornado 
Damage 
  Causes Causes Causes 
Effect Culture High Low High Low High Low 
High Canadian 29 
(90.6%) 
3 
(9.4%) 
30 
(93.8%) 
2 
(6.2%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
 Chinese 18 
(56.2%) 
14 
(43.8%) 
20 
(62.5%) 
12 
(37.5%) 
19 
(59.4%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
Low Canadian 4 
(12.9%) 
27 
(87.1%) 
3 
(9.7%) 
28 
(90.3%) 
4 
(12.9%) 
27 
(87.1%) 
 Chinese 14 
(45.2%) 
17 
(54.8%) 
13 
(41.9%) 
18 
(58.1%) 
13 
(41.9%) 
18 
(58.1%) 
 
 
Confidence Ratings  
A 2 (culture) by 2 (effect magnitude) by 3 (scenario) mixed-design ANOVA 
indicated no significant interactions, all ps > .79. The effect magnitude main effect was 
significant, F(1, 122) = 5.94, p = .02, ηp2 = .05, indicating that participants were more 
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 confident in their choices in the low magnitude condition (M = 6.25, SD = .99) than in the 
high magnitude condition (M = 5.80, SD = 1.15). In addition, the culture main effect was 
significant, F(1, 122) = 11.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, such that Chinese were more confident 
of their choices overall (M = 6.33, SD = .82) than were Canadians (M = 5.71, SD = 1.24). 
Therefore, on this scale as well, Chinese were not more likely than Canadians to prefer 
responses near the midpoint of the scale, thus providing further evidence that a midpoint 
preference by Chinese was unlikely to account for the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2.  
Therefore, Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 using a different 
method and ruled out the potential alternative explanation that Chinese were engaging in 
a moderacy-response bias. In fact, Chinese responded significantly farther from the 
midpoint than did Canadians on confidence ratings of their likelihood judgments.   
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 Chapter 5 
Study 4 
The purpose of Study 4 was to directly test the hypothesis that analytic and 
holistic reasoning was responsible for the cultural differences in the tendency to expect a 
correspondence in magnitude between cause and effect. I developed an exercise to prime 
either analytic or holistic reasoning in Canadian participants. Participants completed the 
exercise, then read a scenario describing a high or low magnitude effect and rated the 
likelihood that high or low magnitude causes had led to that effect. I used two different 
versions of scenarios with two separate samples, one in Study 4a and the other in Study 
4b. 
Study 4a 
Participants 
Sixty-seven European-Canadians (49 women and 18 men) were recruited from 
Queen’s University. Participants received course credit or $5 for their participation.  
Materials and Procedure (See Appendixes E and F for all experimental materials) 
Analytic versus Holistic Prime. One important aspect of analytic versus holistic 
thinking that has been identified in past research is the tendency for analytic thinkers to 
have simple causal theories and for holistic thinkers to have complex causal theories 
(Choi et al., 2003). Therefore, I decided to prime analytic and holistic thinking by 
focusing participants’ attention on either a simple or a complex causal field, respectively.  
For the prime, participants completed an exercise ostensibly unrelated to the rest 
of the study. All participants read that “Getting into a competitive university such as 
Queen’s University is a major achievement. The majority of high school students do not 
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 make it into any university at all, and a large number of applicants to Queen’s are turned 
away every year.” In the analytic prime condition, participants then listed the most 
significant event in their life that had enabled them to get into Queen’s and described 
how it had done so. Lastly, they completed a diagram consisting of two ellipses, one 
labeled “Event” and the other “Getting into Queen’s” by writing the significant event in 
the event ellipse and by drawing an arrow between it and the getting into Queen’s ellipse. 
The exercise was designed to focus each participant’s attention on a single cause that had 
led to a major event in his or her life. The holistic prime was identical to the analytic 
prime except that participants listed the three most significant events.  Holistic reasoning 
not only involves focusing on numerous causes but also focusing on the interactions 
between such causes. Therefore, participants also described how the three events had 
influenced each other. The diagram consisted of four ellipses, three on the periphery 
labeled “Event” and one in the center labeled “Getting into Queen’s.” After writing the 
three events in the event ellipses, participants drew arrows from each one to the Queen’s 
ellipse. Lastly, they drew arrows connecting the three events to describe how these events 
had influenced or interacted with each other. The holistic prime was designed to focus 
participants’ attention on a larger causal field and on the connectedness of causes within 
that field. 
Magnitude Manipulations.  After the prime, participants read the disease scenario 
from Study 1 and rated the likelihood that each of the two causes had led to the effect on 
a 9-point scale (1 = not likely at all, 9 = extremely likely). In summary, Study 4a had a 2 
(prime: analytic vs. holistic) by 2 (effect magnitude: high vs. low) by 2 (cause magnitude: 
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 high vs. low) design. The causal magnitude factor varied within-participants, and the 
other factors varied between-participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
 A 2 (prime: analytic versus holistic) X 2 (effect magnitude) X 2 (cause 
magnitude) mixed-design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of effect 
magnitude, F(1, 63) = 12.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, such that participants in the high 
magnitude effect condition gave higher likelihood ratings for the causes (M = 5.97, SD = 
.94), in comparison with those in the low magnitude effect condition (M = 5.35, SD = 
.92). The effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction was significant, F(1, 63) = 
78.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. Overall, participants tended to associate high magnitude effects 
with high magnitude causes (M = 7.17, SD = 1.56) more than low magnitude causes (M = 
4.51, SD = 1.98), t(63) = 6.55, p < .001, and low magnitude effects with low magnitude 
causes (M = 7.00, SD = 1.30) more than high magnitude causes (M = 4.44, SD = 1.76), 
t(63) = 6.03, p < .001.  
 More importantly, the prime by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction 
was significant, F(1, 63) = 12.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Follow-up mixed-model t tests on 
the interaction indicated that to account for the high magnitude event, analytically-primed 
Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as more likely than did holistically-primed 
Canadians and rated the low magnitude cause as marginally less likely than did 
holistically-primed Canadians, ts(63) > 1.94, ps < .07. For the low magnitude event, 
analytically-primed Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as less likely than did 
holistically-primed Canadians and rated the low magnitude cause as marginally more 
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 likely than did holistically-primed Canadians, ts(63) > 1.67, ps < .09. Therefore, 
Canadians primed to reason analytically exhibited at least a marginally stronger cause-
effect magnitude correspondence than Canadians primed to reason holistically (see 
Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Analytically primed and holistically primed Canadian likelihood estimates 
(+ SE) of high and low magnitude causes leading to high and low magnitude effects 
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 Comparison with Non-Primed Participants from Study 1a 
Participants in Study 1a completed the identical disease scenario but without any 
prime. Therefore, we compared participants from Study 4a with those from Study 1a to 
determine more specifically what effect the analytic and holistic primes had on 
participants. First, we compared analytically primed Canadians with those who received 
no prime. The prime by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 86) = 1.36, p = .25, revealing that Canadians primed to reason 
analytically did not differ from those who received no prime. Next we compared 
holistically primed Canadians with those who received no prime. The prime by effect 
magnitude by cause magnitude interaction was significant, F(1, 91) = 21.39, p < .001, ηp2 
= .19, revealing that it was the holism prime, rather than the analytic prime, that was 
responsible for the effects. Lastly, we compared holistically primed Canadians with 
Chinese from Study 1a who received no prime. The culture by effect magnitude by cause 
magnitude interaction was not significant, F(1, 91) = 1.47, p = .23, revealing that 
Canadians primed to reason holistically did not differ from Chinese who received no 
prime. 
Study 4b 
Participants 
One hundred twenty-one European-Canadians (75 women and 46 men) were 
recruited from Queen’s University. Participants received course credit or $5 for their 
participation.  
Materials and Procedure (See Appendix G for all experimental materials) 
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 The procedure was identical to Study 4a except that participants read a money 
scenario after the prime. I also included a control condition in which participants did not 
receive any prime. The money scenario described a Canadian individual who had either 
accumulated greater than average savings (high magnitude effect) or lesser than average 
savings (low magnitude effect). The scenario was followed by two potential causes, one 
of high magnitude (the individual had a higher than average income) and one of low 
magnitude (the individual had a lower than average income). In summary, Study 4b had a 
3 (prime: none, analytic, or holistic) by 2 (effect magnitude: high vs. low) by 2 (cause 
magnitude: high vs. low) design. The causal magnitude factor varied within-participants, 
and the other factors varied between-participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Test of Cause-Effect Magnitude Correspondence 
A 3 (prime) X 2 (effect magnitude) X 2 (cause magnitude) mixed-design ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of effect magnitude, F(1, 115) = 8.72, p = .004, ηp2 = 
.07, such that participants in the high magnitude effect condition gave higher likelihood 
ratings for the causes (M = 5.52, SD = .97), in comparison with those in the low 
magnitude effect condition (M = 4.77, SD = .98). The effect magnitude by cause 
magnitude interaction was significant, F(1, 115) = 239.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. Overall, 
participants tended to associate high magnitude effects with high magnitude causes (M = 
6.97, SD = 1.53) more than low magnitude causes (M = 3.43, SD = 2.01), t(115) = 11.88, 
p < .001, and low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes (M = 6.57, SD = 1.51) 
more than high magnitude causes (M = 3.07, SD = 1.64), t(115) = 11.65, p < .001.  
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 More importantly, the prime by effect magnitude by cause magnitude interaction 
was significant, F(2, 115) = 6.81, p = .002, ηp2 = .11. We conducted follow-up 2 (prime) 
by 2 (effect magnitude) X 2 (cause magnitude) mixed-design ANOVAs to determine 
more specifically the effects of the primes. Canadians primed to reason analytically did 
not differ in the tendency to match cause and effect magnitudes compared with 
Canadians who received no prime, F(1, 87) = .22, p = .64. As hypothesized, Canadians 
primed to reason analytically exhibited a stronger cause-effect magnitude correspondence 
than Canadians primed to reason holistically, F(1, 61) = 10.16, p = .002, ηp2 = .14. In 
addition, Canadians who received no prime tended to exhibit a stronger cause-effect 
magnitude correspondence than did Canadians primed to reason holistically, F(1, 82) = 
10.26, p = .002, ηp2 = .11. 
Because analytically-primed Canadians did not differ from those receiving no 
prime, we collapsed the two groups together, referred to them as analytic-Canadians, and 
compared them with holistically-primed Canadians. Analytic-Canadians expected more 
cause-effect magnitude correspondence than did holistically primed Canadians, F(1, 115) 
= 13.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Follow-up mixed-model t tests on the interaction indicated 
that to account for the high magnitude event, analytic-Canadians rated the high 
magnitude cause as more likely than did holistically-primed Canadians and rated the low 
magnitude cause as less likely than did holistically-primed Canadians, ts(115) > 2.10, ps 
< .05. For the low magnitude event, analytic-Canadians rated the high magnitude cause as 
less likely (M = 2.78, SD = 1.16) than did holistically-primed Canadians (M = 3.50, SD = 
1.28), t(115) = 1.74, p < .05, and rated the low magnitude cause as marginally more 
likely than did holistically-primed Canadians, t(115) = 1.54, p = .09 (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. No prime, analytically primed, and holistically primed Canadian 
likelihood estimates (+ SE) of high and low magnitude causes leading to high and 
low magnitude effects 
 
Therefore, for both the disease (Study 4a) and the money (Study 4b) scenarios, 
analytically primed Canadians associated high magnitude effects with high magnitude 
causes more than low magnitude causes, and low magnitude effects with low magnitude 
causes marginally more than high magnitude causes. And in both scenarios, holistically 
primed Canadians exhibited this pattern to at least a marginally lesser degree. 
Additionally, comparing participants from Study 4a with participants from Study 1a who 
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 completed the same materials without any prime revealed that the analytic prime had no 
effect. Instead, the holistic prime was the one that caused Canadians to expect less cause-
effect magnitude correspondence. This pattern of results was replicated in Study 4b by 
comparing the participants who received either the analytic prime or the holistic prime 
with participants in a control condition who received no prime. Lastly, comparing 
holistically primed Canadians in Study 4a with Chinese in Study 1a who received no 
prime revealed no cultural differences in the tendency to expect a cause-effect magnitude 
correspondence. 
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 Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
Across three studies, using various methods and scenarios, Canadians expected a 
greater correspondence in magnitude between effects and their causes than did Chinese. 
In a fourth study, both analytically primed Canadians and Canadians who received no 
prime were more likely to expect the correspondence in magnitude between cause and 
effect than were holistically primed Canadians; whereas the holistically primed 
Canadians showed similar responses to Chinese participants. The results not only 
demonstrated cultural differences in the extent to which people expect a correspondence 
in magnitude between cause and effect, but they also demonstrated the underlying factor 
responsible for such cultural differences, namely analytic or holistic reasoning. 
It is important to note that although the cultural interactions were clearly 
significant for all studies, not all of the follow-up tests reached significance. For the high 
magnitude effect condition, the follow-up t tests were significant; whereas for the low 
magnitude effects, many of the follow-up t tests were marginally significant. Looking at 
the pattern of results across studies, the pattern is clear and consistent. Canadians do 
indeed expect stronger cause-effect magnitude correspondence than do Chinese. The 
marginally significant results most likely signal boundary conditions in which the effects 
are weaker. The fact that the effects were weaker in the low magnitude effect condition 
could be explained by participants being more engaged by high than low magnitude 
events. It would be interesting to explore such explanations in future research. 
Alternative Explanations and Potential Limitations 
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 One alternative explanation for the findings is that Chinese tend to prefer the 
midpoints of scales and, therefore, responded more moderately. In the first two studies, 
participants selected values on a Likert-type scale to judge the likelihood that high and 
low magnitude causes enabled high and low magnitude events. However, Study 3 
provided strong evidence against this alternative explanation. When asked to choose the 
more likely cause, rather than to estimate the likelihood on a scale, the same pattern of 
results emerged across three scenarios, suggesting that the cultural differences obtained in 
our studies were not due to a response bias in Chinese participants. Furthermore, when 
asked to indicate their confidence in their choices using a Likert-type scale, Chinese were 
more confident than Canadians. Therefore, Chinese responded more extremely than 
Canadians, rather than more moderately on this scale. 
Another alternative explanation for the results is that Chinese may be less familiar 
with the scenarios than are Canadians. If people are reasoning about the cause of an effect 
in a context where causes and effects do tend to correspond in magnitude in the real 
world, then the tendency to predict such an association would be prudent. Therefore, if 
Canadians are more familiar than Chinese are with a scenario, and thus the underlying 
causes of the effect in that scenario, then Canadians should expect a greater degree of 
correspondence between cause and effect.  
This potential alternative explanation has at least three problems. First, when 
choosing and designing my scenarios, I was very careful to generate scenarios that were 
familiar and understandable to both cultural groups. In direct collaboration with two 
Chinese nationals who were born, raised, and spent most of their lives in China, I 
generated a number of potential scenarios. I then refined the final set of scenarios from 
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 the much larger initial set by endeavoring to ensure the events and causes were both 
culturally appropriate and perceived to be equivalently likely and plausible across both 
cultures. These final scenarios were then carefully checked by our Chinese collaborators 
in Beijing and Wuhan, along with a number of their Chinese graduate students. After 
numerous revisions I chose a set of events and causes that were perceived to be equally 
likely to occur across cultures. A second problem with the alternative explanation is that 
Chinese indicated higher confidence levels in their judgments than did Canadians, thus 
providing evidence against the conjecture that Chinese were responding more moderately 
due to unfamiliarity with the scenarios. A third problem is that even if all my efforts at 
ensuring equivalent levels of familiarity with the scenarios failed, and Chinese indicated 
higher levels of confidence for some alternative reason, the familiarity explanation would 
not fit with the pattern of results in Studies 4a and 4b. One would have difficulty 
explaining, based on familiarity with the scenarios, why priming Canadians to think 
holistically would cause them to respond similar to Chinese, namely by expecting a lesser 
degree of cause-effect magnitude correspondence.  
One potential limitation of this research stems from the way magnitude was 
manipulated in the events and the causes presented. In order to rule out the potential 
problems with previous research, whereby the magnitude of causes and effects was 
confounded with other factors, such as the content, I simplified the scenarios, so that 
magnitude was the most salient factor. As a result, one might argue that the scenarios 
were relatively simplistic compared to the types of information people might encounter in 
the everyday world. Making magnitude the most salient feature of the scenarios may have 
caused analytic Canadians to focus most of their attention on that feature, relative to 
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 Chinese who attend to the world more holistically. One could then argue that there is 
nothing special about magnitude, and that we would find a similar pattern of results for 
whatever feature was made salient to Canadians. As a simple example, if the damage 
caused by a tornado was green in colour, and we included a green and a blue tornado as 
potential causes, Canadians might lock onto the colour due to their analytic style of 
thinking; whereas Chinese might consider other factors, such as magnitude, and the 
opposite pattern of results might emerge. Chinese would then expect more cause-effect 
magnitude correspondence than Canadians.  
However, research indicates that there is something special about magnitude; it is 
not an arbitrary feature in terms of its importance to our field of attention. Osgood sought 
to determine the dimensions by which people categorize objects by factor analyzing 
adjectives and found that three meaningful factors emerged. He identified magnitude as 
one of the fundamental dimensions people naturally focus on and use when judging 
entities (Osgood, 1957; referred to as potency and characterized by adjective pairs such 
as large-small and strong-weak). As a result, he demonstrated that magnitude is an 
inherently salient and fundamentally meaningful dimension. In order of importance, 
magnitude came right after evaluation (good-bad) and before action (active-passive). In 
addition, Osgood, May, and Miron (1975) demonstrated the potential universality of the 
importance of these three dimensions by conducting numerous investigations in over 29 
cultures, including North Americans and Chinese. 
It is important to note another limitation of this research. It is important to note 
that holism does not appear to be a simple uniform construct determined by a single 
cognitive mechanism. For example, researchers have focused on at least four factors 
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 under the umbrella term holism: causality (Choi et al., 2003), attitude toward 
contradiction (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999), perception of change (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001), 
and locus of attention (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; see also Nisbett et al., 2001). The 
present research focused on the causality factor. Our prime was specifically developed to 
affect analytic and holistic reasoning patterns related to causality. We have no research 
evidence regarding how the present research relates to the other three factors. One other 
limitation of this research is that all four studies asked participants to explain events by 
judging the likelihood of causes. We do not know whether the reverse pattern of results 
would be similar, when given causes and asked to judge the likelihood that they enabled 
certain events. Based on the present literature, we have no reason to expect any 
differences. 
 Another alternative explanation hinges upon potential cultural differences in 
conversational norms, especially the norm of relevance (Grice, 1975). If Canadians 
believe that information provided by others is relevant to the task at hand to a greater 
extent than Chinese, then Canadians may have made greater use of the magnitude 
information in the scenarios than Chinese. As a result, Canadians likelihood judgments 
would have been influenced by the magnitude information more so than Chinese 
judgments. Ji, Schwarz, and Nisbett (2000) found evidence that Chinese and Americans 
equally relied on response scales as a frame of reference for behaviour frequency 
estimates when they had little episodic knowledge about the behaviours, suggesting that 
the norm of relevance may apply in the Chinese context as well.  Thus, conversational 
norms may not be a valid alternative explanation, although additional research will be 
useful to address this issue. 
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 Theoretical Contributions 
Culture and Attributions. Gilovich and Savitsky (2002, p. 618) defined the 
representativeness heuristic as the tendency to process information “on the basis of one 
overarching rule: ‘Like goes with like.’” Most of the research on this heuristic has been 
conducted in the context of categorization; whereas little research has explored the 
representativeness heuristic in the context of attributions. The tendency to expect causes 
and effects to correspond in magnitude is a species of this heuristic. Although some have 
speculated on the tendency to expect cause-effect magnitude correspondence when 
making attributions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Nisbett, 1980), little research has 
systematically investigated such speculation. Our studies demonstrated that people from 
two different cultures, Canada and China, indeed tend to expect cause and effect to 
correspond in magnitude. As a result, I have made a significant contribution to the 
attribution literature by providing strong and consistent empirical support that people 
tend to explain events in a manner consistent with what one would expect if relying on 
the representativeness heuristic.  
In addition, my studies offer a significant contribution to both the attribution 
literature and the cultural psychology literature by demonstrating that the degree to which 
people expect cause-effect magnitude correspondence differs across cultures. The fact 
that Canadians expected a greater degree of correspondence in magnitude when making 
causal judgments indicates that they exhibit a more extreme form of the 
representativeness heuristic in this context, compared with Chinese. My study is the first 
that I am aware of to demonstrate cultural differences in the degree to which people 
employ the representativeness heuristic in the context of attributions.  
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 Most importantly, my finding that the degree to which people expect cause-effect 
magnitude correspondence is in part determined by whether or not they reason 
analytically or holistically enhances our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of 
the representativeness heuristic in the context of attributions. My studies provide the first 
evidence that the representativeness heuristic is, at least in part, caused by the degree of 
complexity one attends to in a causal field. Furthermore, the fact that this tendency differs 
across cultures signals the need to investigate whether or not cultural differences would 
emerge for other heuristics.  
Cultural Universals. Notably, within the domain of my scenarios and designs, 
participants from both cultures expected a cause-effect magnitude correspondence. What 
differed across cultures was the degree to which people expected this correspondence. 
Norenzayan and Heine (2005) outlined a taxonomy of cultural universals, defined as core 
mental attributes shared by people everywhere. The taxonomy consists of four levels of 
cultural universality: accessibility, functional, existential, and nonuniversality. 
Accessibility universals, the most stringent level of universality, are psychological 
processes that are available to all people, used for the same function, and accessed to the 
same degree. Functional universals, the second most stringent level of universality, are 
cognitively available to all people, used for the same function, but accessed to different 
degrees. Existential universals, the third most stringent level of universality, are 
cognitively available to all people, but they may be used in markedly different ways and 
are accessed to different degrees. Nonuniversals are those processes that are not 
cognitively available to all people.  
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 Although I only sampled people from two cultures, my pattern of results 
demonstrating that participants from both cultures expected cause-effect magnitude 
correspondence, but to different degrees, would potentially qualify as a functional 
universal. My studies provide the first evidence that I am aware of regarding the 
universality and cultural variability of the representativeness heuristic. What appears on 
the surface to be a simple heuristic, the tendency to associate high magnitude effects with 
high magnitude causes and low magnitude effects with low magnitude causes, is applied 
to different degrees depending on how our host culture has shaped our minds to process 
information.  
Practical Implications 
The pattern of results could also have important practical implications. One 
potential application is in the domain of behavioral decision making. According to the 
U.S. Federal Reserve, per capita personal debt in the United States has increased by at 
least a factor of 10 between 1945 and 2005, reaching unprecedented levels (Massey, 
2008). The causes of this trend are surely complex, and I do not intend to oversimplify 
them or claim that my research has solved this problem. However, my results could 
potentially contribute to better understanding and ameliorating the situation. For example, 
North Americans may be more likely to believe that in order to accumulate wealth or to 
resolve their debt problems, they need to focus on cutting back on major costs and 
purchases. In doing so, they may pay little attention to the financial impact of minor 
routine expenses. Consistent with this possibility, financial experts are advising people to 
cut back on minor expenses, such as the purchase of a daily cup of coffee at a trendy café, 
because such purchases add up over time. Thus, for people who find themselves in debt, 
 45
 realizing the importance of reducing minor routine expenses could enable them to more 
quickly and effectively ameliorate their financial hardship. In addition, the results from 
Study 4, demonstrating that the tendency to expect a magnitude correspondence is 
reduced when primed to think holistically, provides hope that people can reduce the 
degree to which they overlook minor expenses in such situations. I am investigating some 
of these implications in my ongoing research. 
Meanwhile, this research could have mirror-image implications for East Asians. 
For example, research indicates that when people are aware that a certain behaviour, such 
as smoking, is detrimental to their health and yet the desire or craving to engage in the 
behaviour proves too difficult to resist, they may generate or utilize existing 
compensatory health beliefs to neutralize the cognitive dissonance aroused by the 
behaviour (Knäuper, Rabiau, Cohen, & Patriciu, 2004). Compensatory health beliefs 
(CHBs) are beliefs that the negative effects of an unhealthy behavior can be compensated 
for by engaging in healthy behaviors. For example, choosing to smoke because one 
believes that one eats well is an example of such a belief. Holding CHBs hinders people 
from making healthier lifestyle choices. One of the factors that may influence the efficacy 
of using such beliefs to deal with dissonance may be the degree of causal complexity one 
considers. If Person A believes that lung cancer is a product of smoking, air pollution, his 
diet, and his exercise routine, and Person B only considers smoking and exercise, than 
Person A should have a larger potential number of CHBs that he can generate. Thus, East 
Asians may be more likely to make use of CHBs. East Asians may underestimate the 
importance of major health-related behaviors because they believe that other minor 
health-related behaviors will compensate. For example, when told by a medical expert 
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 that ceasing a pernicious behaviour, such as smoking, is essential for dealing with a major 
illness, such as lung cancer, Easterners may be more likely to believe that their other 
health-related behaviors, such as eating well, will compensate for the detrimental effects 
of smoking  
The present research also has practical implications for problem solving and 
negotiation. The human world is becoming increasingly interconnected and many nations 
are becoming more ethnically diverse. People from different cultures are realizing the 
growing need to work together to solve problems, such as those currently undermining 
political and financial stability, as well as those plaguing our natural environment. When 
investigating the cause of a high magnitude effect, Westerners’ tendency to expect high 
magnitude causes may lead them to overlook relatively lower magnitude causes that 
might have played a key role. On the other hand, Chinese might overemphasize factors 
that played a minor role at the expense of those that played a major role. These different 
tendencies to emphasize high versus low magnitude causes could potentially lead to 
disagreement or international conflict. In a world in which cross-cultural interaction is 
crucial, further understanding cultural differences in reasoning about cause and effect 
relationships could prove important both for finding solutions to the problems and for 
negotiating diplomatic resolutions to the inevitable disagreements that will arise between 
nations.  
This research also has important implications for other areas of research, such as 
persuasion. People who expect a correspondence in magnitude between effects and their 
causes may find arguments consistent with such expectations highly persuasive compared 
with arguments that are not. A message attempting to persuade people to purchase a 
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 major costly product because it is the only solution to their major problems may be more 
effective for North Americans than East Asians. Alternatively, a message attempting to 
persuade people that a minor inexpensive product is important may be more effective for 
East Asians than North Americans. Additionally, a prime similar to mine embedded 
within the message may increase its effectiveness in both cases. 
People associate big causes with big effects and small causes with small effects. 
However, the degree to which we make this association is at least partially determined by 
the reasoning processes we are imbued with from the culture in which our minds 
developed. Some physicists believe that our universe, created by the big bang, will end in 
a big crunch. Perhaps a more holistic interpretation of this scenario would result in the 
universe that began from the big bang ending in a small crunch. 
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 Appendix A: Questionnaires for Study 1a 
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read the following incident: 
 
21 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken 
with symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 11 of these individuals had 
experienced a rapid but horrific death and the other 10 were still in hospital.  
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only 
one event occurred at the company above and caused the incident. How likely do 
you think each of the two events below is to have caused the incident? Using the 
scale below, write the number for each event on the blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of 
super-bacteria, while on a business trip. 
 
Event B ___ An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, 
while on a business trip. 
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 Questionnaires for Study 1a: 
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read the following incident: 
 
7 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken 
with symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 3 of these individuals had 
recovered and the other 4 were still experiencing minor symptoms. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only 
one event occurred at the company above and caused the incident. How likely do 
you think each of the two events below is to have caused the incident? Using the 
scale below, write the number for each event on the blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of 
super-bacteria, while on a business trip. 
 
Event B ___ An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, 
while on a business trip. 
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 Appendix B: Questionnaires for Study 1b 
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read about the following negotiation: 
 
Two parties are negotiating a new contract. This negotiation took over 31 
weeks to reach an agreement, which is much longer than usual compared with 
other similar negotiations. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but during different negotiations. Only 
one event occurred during the negotiation described above. How likely do you 
think it is that each event occurred during the above negotiation? Using the scale 
below, write your estimate for each event on the 2 blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ Two negotiating parties could not agree on one major point, which 
amounted to 41% of the total contract. 
 
Event B ___ Two negotiating parties could not agree on one minor point, which 
amounted to 10% of the total contract. 
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 Questionnaires for Study 1b: 
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read about the following negotiation: 
 
Two parties are negotiating a new contract. This negotiation took only 2 
weeks to reach an agreement, which is typical compared with other similar 
negotiations. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but during different negotiations. Only 
one event occurred during the negotiation described above. How likely do you 
think it is that each event occurred during the above negotiation? Using the scale 
below, write your estimate for each event on the 2 blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ Two negotiating parties could not agree on one major point, which 
amounted to 41% of the total contract. 
 
Event B ___ Two negotiating parties could not agree on one minor point, which 
amounted to 10% of the total contract. 
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 Appendix C: Questionnaires for Study 2 
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive likelihood estimates. Answer the following 
questions with your initial reaction. There are no tricks, so do not spend too much time on 
each one. 
      
1. One of the two players scored the most points in a professional 
basketball game. What is the likelihood that it was: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player X? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                    Likely 
 
Player Y? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                  Likely 
 
X Y
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2. Both tornadoes went through a city. One of them caused severe 
damage. What is the likelihood that it was:  (both pictures taken at same 
distance from center of tornado) 
  
Tornado P? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                     Likely 
 
Tornado Q? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                Likely 
 
QP
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 Questionnaires for Study 2: 
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive likelihood estimates. Answer the following 
questions with your initial reaction. There are no tricks, so do not spend too much time on 
each one.   
 
1. One of the two players scored the least points in a professional 
basketball game. What is the likelihood that it was: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player X? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                 Likely 
 
Player Y? –  
 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                  Likely 
 
Y X 
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2. Both tornadoes went through a city. One of them caused no damage at 
all. What is the likelihood that it was: (both pictures taken at same distance 
from center of tornado) 
     
Tornado P? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                  Likely 
 
Tornado Q? –  
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Extremely                          Extremely 
Unlikely                                  Likely 
 
QP
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 Appendix D: Questionnaires for Study 3 
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive likelihood estimates. Answer the following 
questions with your initial reaction. There are no tricks, so do not spend too much time on 
each one. 
      
1. One of the two players scored the most points in a professional 
basketball game.                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who do you think it most likely was (circle one)? Man X Man Y 
 
How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
 
 
2. Both tornadoes went through a city. One of them caused severe damage 
(both pictures taken at same distance from center of tornado). 
             
        
 
Which do you think it most likely was (circle one)? Tornado P Tornado Q  
 
    How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
 
 
X Y
QP
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Which event do you think most likely occurred at the company above? (Circle one) 
 
Event A    Event B 
 
How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
Event B - An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, while on 
a business trip. 
 
3.      21 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken 
with symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 11 of these individuals 
had experienced a rapid but horrific death and the other 10 were still in hospital. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only one 
event occurred at the company above. 
 
Event A - An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of super-
bacteria, while on a business trip. 
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 Questionnaires for Study 3: 
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive likelihood estimates. Answer the following 
questions with your initial reaction. There are no tricks, so do not spend too much time on 
each one. 
      
1. One of the two players scored the least points in a professional 
basketball game.                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who do you think it most likely was (circle one)? Man X Man Y 
 
How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
 
 
2. Both tornadoes went through a city. One of them caused no damage at 
all (both pictures taken at same distance from center of tornado). 
 
         
 
Which do you think it most likely was (circle one)? Tornado P Tornado Q  
 
    How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
 
 
X Y
Q P
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3. 7 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken with 
symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 3 of these individuals had 
recovered and the other 4 were still experiencing minor symptoms. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only one 
event occurred at the company above. 
 
Event A - An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of super-
bacteria, while on a business trip. 
 
 
Event B - An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, while on 
a business trip. 
 
Which event do you think most likely occurred at the company above? (Circle one) 
 
Event A    Event B 
 
How confident are you about your above estimate? (Circle one number) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
 Not at all       Extremely 
confident       confident 
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 Appendix E: Priming scenarios for Studies 4a and 4b 
 
Analytic Prime: 
 
Achievements 
 
 Getting into a competitive university such as Queen’s University is a major 
achievement. The majority of high school students do not make it into any university at 
all, and a large number of applicants to Queen’s are turned away every year. 
 
 Think of the most significant event in your life that enabled you to accomplish 
this major achievement. This event must have occurred within 10 years of getting 
accepted into Queen’s. Briefly describe the event and explain how it enabled you to get 
into Queen’s. 
 
A) Briefly describe the event: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
B) Briefly explain how it enabled you to get into Queen’s: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
C) (i) Enter the event below in one or two words. (ii) Then draw an arrow 
connecting it to the accomplishment: 
 
 
 
  
Event 
Acceptance to Queen’s
Accomplishment 
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 Priming scenarios for Studies 4a and 4b  
 
Holistic Prime: 
 
Achievements 
 
 Getting into a competitive university such as Queen’s University is a major 
achievement. The majority of high school students do not make it into any university at 
all, and a large number of applicants to Queen’s are turned away every year. 
 
 Think of the 3 most significant events in your life that enabled you to accomplish 
this major achievement. These events must have occurred within 10 years of getting 
accepted into Queen’s, and they must have influenced each other somehow. Briefly 
describe the 3 events and explain how they enabled you to get into Queen’s. Lastly, 
explain how the 3 events have influenced each other. 
 
A) Briefly describe the events: 
 
Event 1:  
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event 2: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event 3: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 B) Briefly explain how each event enabled you to get into Queen’s: 
 
Event 1:  
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event 2: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Event 3: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
C) Briefly explain how the 3 events influenced each other: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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 (D) (i) Enter each event below in one or two words. (ii) Then draw arrows 
connecting each event to the accomplishment. (iii) Lastly, draw arrows 
connecting the 3 events to each other to show how they influenced each other. 
 
 
Acceptance to Queen’s
Event 2 
Accomplishment 
Event 1 
Event 3 
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 Appendix F: Questionnaires for Study 4a 
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read the following incident: 
 
21 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken 
with symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 11 of these individuals had 
experienced a rapid but horrific death and the other 10 were still in hospital.  
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only 
one event occurred at the company above and caused the incident. How likely do 
you think each of the two events below is to have caused the incident? Using the 
scale below, write the number for each event on the blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of 
super-bacteria, while on a business trip. 
 
Event B ___ An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, 
while on a business trip. 
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 Questionnaires for Study 4a 
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about events they may or may 
not be familiar with. Please read the following incident: 
 
7 people at a major downtown company became ill. They were stricken 
with symptoms of nausea and vomiting. Within 3 days, 3 of these individuals had 
recovered and the other 4 were still experiencing minor symptoms. 
 
The two events below actually occurred, but at two separate companies. Only 
one event occurred at the company above and caused the incident. How likely do 
you think each of the two events below is to have caused the incident? Using the 
scale below, write the number for each event on the blank spaces. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
Event A ___ An employee came into contact with a highly infectious type of 
super-bacteria, while on a business trip. 
 
Event B ___ An employee came into contact with a standard type of bacteria, 
while on a business trip. 
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 Appendix G: Questionnaires for Study 4b  
 
High magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about scenarios they may or 
may not be familiar with. Please read the following scenario: 
 
A person in Canada started with no savings whatsoever and has been 
working at a job for 25 years. During this time, this person has accumulated a 
substantial amount of savings. Compared to the total working population of 
Canada, this person’s net worth is in the top 30%.  
 
How likely do you think it is that each person below could be the person above? 
Using the scale below, write your estimate for each person on the blank space. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
1. ___ Person A has a much higher than average income. 
 
2. ___ Person B has a slightly lower than average income.  
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 Questionnaires for Study 4b  
 
Low magnitude effect condition: 
 
We are interested in people’s intuitive predictions about scenarios they may or 
may not be familiar with. Please read the following scenario: 
 
A person in Canada started with no savings whatsoever and has been 
working at a job for 25 years. During this time, this person has accumulated a 
small amount of savings. Compared to the total working population of Canada, 
this person’s net worth is in the bottom 30%.  
 
How likely do you think it is that each person below could be the person above? 
Using the scale below, write your estimate for each person on the blank space. 
 
 
1               2              3              4              5               6              7              8           9                     
Not Likely        Somewhat                   Extremely 
At All             Likely                Likely 
 
There is no tricky information hidden in the scenario so do not spend too much 
time on each one – your initial reaction is best. 
 
1. ___ Person A has a much higher than average income. 
 
2. ___ Person B has a slightly lower than average income.  
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